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John W. Davis and His Role in the Public
School Segregation Cases -
A Personal Memoir
Sydnor Thompsont
In August 1951, Governor James F Byrnes of South Carolina retained
John W Davis (W&L A.B. 1892, LL.B. 1895), then semor partner at Davis
Polk Wardwell Sunderland & Kiendl (Davis Polk) m New York City, to
represent the State of South Carolina in Bnggs v Elliott,1 one of five
compamon public school segregation cases (the School Segregation Cases)
that, according to the lawyer who wrote the U.S. Attorney General's amicus
curiae brief, "changed the whole course of race relations in the United
States." 2 During that summer, I rejoined Davis Polk as an associate after a
year's leave of absence to study law at Manchester University and the
London School of Economics and Political Science under the auspices of the
Fulbright Program. By virtue of that coincidence of events, I was provided
an opportunity to work with one whom a commentator called "probably the
nation's most distinguished appellate lawyer 3 on a case that other commen-
tators have characterized as "the most important Supreme Court decision of
the century, "' and very close to if not actually "the most important decision
in the history of the Court. "I
* Member of the North C arolina and New York Bars. Of Counsel, Parker, Poe,
Adams & Bernstein, Charlotte, North Carolina. Former Judge, North Carolina Court of
Appeals. A.B., Syracuse, 1947; LL.B., Harvard, 1950. The author's father, Charles
William Sydnor Thompson, Sr., attended Washington & Lee Law School and served as
President of the intermediate law class m 1921.
1. (Brown v Board of Educ.), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Philip Elman, The Solicitor General's Office, Justice Franyrurter, and Civil Rights
Litigation, 1946-1960: An Oral History, 100 HARv L. REv 817, 837 (1986) (interview by
Norman Silber).
3. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 461 (1994).
4. JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS 197 (1994).
5. RiCHARD KLUGER, SmPLE JUSTICE 709 (1975).
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L The First Eighty Years
John William Davis was born on April 13, 1873 in Clarksburg, West
Virginia, the son of United States Congressman John J. Davis. John J.
Davis was a typically conservative southerner of his day, serving the cause
of white supremacy and states' rights while in Congress and contending on
the floor of the United States House of Representatives that the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution had been
fraudulently adopted under circumstances in which the southern states had
been illegally deprived of their rightful representation in the governmental
bodies that adopted those amendments. 6 Despite the elder Davis's conserva-
tive stance on social issues, he aligned himself in his law practice against the
large corporate interests of his day In representing the underprivileged
members of Is community, he demonstrated his belief that the law is a
profession rather than a business.7
John W Davis studied the classics at an early age under his mother's
tutelage. He attended private schools in Clarksburg and in Albemarle
County, Virginia, and in 1889 he enrolled as a sophomore at Washington
and Lee College in Lexington, Virginia, at a time when General Robert E.
Lee's son, Custis Lee, had succeeded ins father as president! Two years
after earning a bachelor's degree in 1892, he entered the W&L Law School
and graduated in 1895, going immediately into practice with is father in
Clarksburg. At the invitation of Ins former professor, Dean John Randolph
Tucker, he accepted a teaching position at the W&L Law School, but served
there for only one year. From that post he returned to Clarksburg to prac-
tice law and soon established a reputation as one of the outstanding lawyers
in West Virginia, serving as president of its bar association at the age of
thirty-three. Already his politeness and uique combination of warmth and
reserve had won him many friends and admirers. After serving in the West
Virginia House of Representatives, he served two terms in the United States
Congress, where he soon became known as the ablest lawyer in Congress. 9
6. WILLIAM H. HARBAUGH, LAWYER'S LAWYER: THE LIFE OF JOHN W DAVIs 9
(1973).
7 Id. at 10.
8. He recounted to his colleagues at Davis Polk the story of how he and his friend
Reynolds Vance had shared a bed in his first year there, a practice that was not uncommon
for students and circuit riding lawyers in the 1800s. At the dedication of a portrait of
Reynolds Vance at Yale University m New Haven, Connecticut, he told the assemblage, "I
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During his time m Congress, he championed the cause of workmen's com-
pensation as an appropriate regulation of interstate commerce and favored
free trade, despite the fact that his own constituents felt threatened by it.
Perhaps the high point of his progressive record came when he offered a bill
to limit the issuance of injunctions against strikers in labor disputes. It
eventually became a part of the Clayton Antitrust Act. 10
In August 1913, Davis was appointed by President Woodrow Wilson
as Solicitor General of the United States. True to form, he excelled in that
post, as he had in each of is other career opportunities. During his service
there he won a significant victory for black voters by convincing the United
States Supreme Court that an Oklahoma "grandfather clause" exempting
from a literacy test those voters whose ancestors had been eligible to vote
prior to January 22, 1866 violated the Fifteenth Amendment." When Davis
resigned as Solicitor General, he had argued sixty-seven cases before the
United States Supreme Court, winning forty-eight of them.12 His arguments
were frequently praised by the Justices before whom he appeared.
In 1918, while Davis was attending a meeting in Bern, Switzerland,
as one of four commissioners to a conference with the Germans on the
treatment and exchange of prisoners of war, President Wilson invited
him to accept an appointment as ambassador to the Court of St. James in
London. After much soul-searching, he accepted the post with the encour-
agement of Lord Reading, then the British ambassador to the United States,
with whom he had formed a close friendship during his service in Wash-
ington, D.C. The British received Davis warmly His gentlemanly man-
ners and quiet dignity served hun well in the diplomatic service, as might
have been anticipated. He related well to both Prime Minister Lloyd George
and King George V As a consequence of that service, he became a zealous
Anglophile and visited Great Britain frequently for the rest of Ins life. 3
Although Davis continued to enjoy the confidence of the British, Is
yearning to return to law practice, which was always his first love, finally
10. Seeid. at7O-71.
11. Gumn v United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915). The Court held that the Oklahoma
statute was designed to discrnmate against black voters since they did not have the right to
vote prior to January 22, 1866.
12. He eventually argued 140 cases before the Supreme Court during his career at the
Bar.
13. Queen Elizabeth II appointed hun a Kmght Grand Cross of the Most Excellent
Order of the British Empire, the highest civilian distinction that the Queen could bestow upon
a citizen of the United States. He was also an honorary bencher of the Middle Temple.
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prevailed. He returned to the United States m March 1921 to join the well-
established New York law firm of Stetson, Jennings and Russell. Most of
that firm's senior partners were at the point of retirement, and Davis was
virtually invited to dictate his own terms as the new head of the firm. 4 His
good friend Frank Polk, who had served the American Red Cross in Europe,
also received an offer from the firm, and the two friends were soon prac-
ticing together there under the firm name Davis Polk Wardwell Gardiner and
Reed. The firm had for some years represented J.P Morgan and Co.,
Guaranty Trust Company of New York, the Erie Railroad, and a number of
other major financial institutions. J.P Morgan himself relied heavily on
Davis's legal advice. Opinions differ as to whether Davis's representing
such major corporate interests for many years served to encourage Ins
increasingly conservative bent or whether he merely reverted to his native
political philosophy after a period of public service in Congress and as
Solicitor General. In any case, from the time he began to practice law mi
New York City in the early 1920s, his political and economic views
definitely assumed a strong conservative hue.
Eighteen months after he joined the New York firm, he was widely
touted as a candidate to replace Justice William R. Day on the Umted States
Supreme Court.15 Many of his friends at the New York bar, as'well as some
of the Justices who had admired Ins work as Solicitor General, urged him to
seek the post, which was said to have been his for the asking. ' 6 In declining
to permit his name to be submitted, however, he told prominent New York
lawyer Charles C. Burlingham, "I have taken the vows of chastity and obedi-
ence but not of poverty "'7
14. In later years he often voluntarily accepted significant reductions in his own percent-
age of the firm's profits m order to reward his younger partners. On one occasion, when
Nelson Adams waited upon him to accept an invitation to partnership, Davis interrupted him
to say, "Not so fast, Brother Adams, I suggest you have a look at our books before you
accept." Letter from Nelson Adams, Senior Counsel, Davis Polk and Wardwell (successor
firm to Davis Polk Wardwell Sunderland & Kiendl), to the author (Apr. 25, 1995) (on file
with author).
15. HARBAUGH, supra note 6, at 191.
16. Id. at 190-91.
17 Id. at 192. When he returned to this country from his position as ambassador to the
Court of St. James, Davis was not only virtually penniless, but he had also incurred
substantial debts in his country's service there. It is fair to say that he was hardly free to
engage in any further public service at that time. Letter from Nelson Adams, Senior
Counsel, Davis Polk and Wardwell (successor firm to Davis Polk Wardwell Sunderland &
Kiendl), to the author (Sept. 7, 1995) (on file with author). Most Americans who have filled
that post have been independently wealthy
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In 1924, Davis was nominated for President of the United States by the
Democratic National Convention as a compromise candidate between two
warring factions of the Democratic Party - the supporters of Al Smith and
those of William G. McAdoo - on the 103d ballot. The more liberal voices
m the Democratic Party were of the opinion that Davis's intimate association
with the moguls of Wall Street, especially J.P Morgan, disqualified him as
a potential Democratic nominee. In response to the suggestion that he resign
from his firm in order to meet that criticism, he wrote a letter that received
wide circulation and - at least for a time - quieted the criticism."8 It has
18. The letter read m part:
If I were in the market for the goods you offer, I would not complain of the char-
acter of this consignment, although I notice you do not guarantee delivery. The
price you put on them, however, is entirely too high. You offer me a chance to
be the Democratic nommee for the Presidency which carries with it m this year
of grace more than a fair prospect of becoming President of the United States. In
exchange, I am to abandon forthwith and immediately a law practice which is both
pleasant and, within modest bounds, profitable; to throw over honorable clients
who offer me honest employment; and desert a group of professional colleagues
who are able, upright and loyal. If this were all, I would think your figures pretty
stiff, but you are really asking something still more.
I have been at the bar nearly thirty years, and with the exception of ten years
spent in public life I have enjoyed during the whole of that time a practice of an
extremely varied character.
At no time have I confined my services to a single client, and in conse-
quence I have been called upon to serve a great many different kinds of men; some
of them good, some of them indifferently good, and others over whose character
we will drop the veil of charity Indeed, some of my clients - thanks perhaps to
their failure to secure a better lawyer - have become the involuntary guests for
fixed terms of the nation and the state. Since the law, however, is a profession
and not a trade, I conceive it to be the duty of the lawyer, just as it is the duty of
the priest or the surgeon, to serve those who call on hn unless, indeed, there is
some insuperable obstacle in the way
No one in all this list of clients has ever controlled or even fancied that he
could control my personal or my political conscience. I am vain enough to inag-
me that no one ever will. The only limitation upon a right-thinkng lawyer's
independence is the duty which he owes to his clients, once selected, to serve them
without the slightest thought of the effect such a service may have upon his per-
sonal popularity or his political fortunes. Any lawyer who surrenders this inde-
pendence or shades this duty by trimming his professional course to fit the gusts
ofpopular opinion in my judgment not only dishonors himself but disparages and
degrades the great profession to which he should be proud to belong. You must
not thnk me either indifferent or unappreciative if I tell you in candor that I would
not pay this price for any honor in the gift of man.
Id. at 198-99 (emphasis added) (quoting letter from John W Davis to Theodore Huntley
(Mar. 4, 1924)).
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since been heralded as an eloquent apologia for the integrity of the pro-
fession.19
Davis's candidacy was destined for failure from the outset, however,
because of the disaffection of a large body of liberal Democrats who
supported Robert LaFollette as a Farmer-Labor candidate and who thus split
the Democratic vote. The truth is that the 1924 campaign appears to have
been the high water mark of Davis's political progressiveness.2 He eventu-
ally became a staunch opponent of most of President Roosevelt's New Deal
program.21
Despite Davis's continuing preference for constitutional principles that
strictly limited the impingement of government on the private economy, he
enthusiastically lent his support to two highly controversial public figures,
Alger Hiss and Robert Oppenheimer, during the McCarthy years. With
Lloyd Garrison, he advised Hiss in connection with the latter's perjury
trial.' He represented Oppenheimer before the Atomic Energy Commission
at Oppenhener's security clearance hearing.'
Davis also accepted employment on behalf of a number of his friends
and fellow lawyers who were under attack. Isador J. Kresel, a New York
lawyer, was charged with a crime arising out of a bank failure. Louis Levy
was alleged to have been implicated in bribery charges brought against Judge
Martin Manton of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Davis never flinched from appearing in unpopular causes.'
19. Not everyone accepted the apologia at face value. Felix Frankfurter, then teaching
at Harvard Law School, did not favor Davis's candidacy. See id. at 201-02. He criticized
Davis for denying that his connection with the most powerful banking firm in the world had
any relationship to his fitness for the presidency- "Mr. Davis is not content to rest his Morgan
retainer on those ultimate grounds of preference which are open to every free man. He must
account for himself on the score of duty." Id. at 202. Indeed, Frankfurter faulted Davis and
Wall Street lawyers in general for their "crass materialism"- "Davis's career is subtly
mischievous in its influence on the standards of the next generation." Id. at 242.
20. For example, despite the strong recommendation of most of his campaign advisers
to the contrary, he came out four-square against the Ku Klux Klan, which was then in its
heyday Id. at 229.
21. In later years when he was asked if he were still a Democrat, he responded "yes,
dammit, very still." Id. at 342.
22. See id. at 449-51.
23. Id. at 459. Davisjoined Garrison in a letter protesting the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion's refusal to allow Davis to deliver an oral argument on the appeal. Davis was outraged
at the cavalier treatment Oppenheimer received. Id. at 453-61.
24. In 1941 Davis wrote a distinguished paper about the lawyers who defended Louis
XVI of France before the National Convention - Malesherbes, Tonchet, and deSeze.
Hazard Gillespie, Davis's partner and now senior counsel to the firm, provided me with a
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The last great Supreme Court victory that Davis enjoyed was mn the case
of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer, m which, as counsel for the
steel companies, he opposed President Truman's seizure of the steel indus-
try Truman's action was the means by which he sought to forestall a gen-
eral strike during the Korean War. After Davis had delivered an eighty-
seven minute attack on the President's action, the Supreme Court held that
the seizure of the steel industry was unconstitutional.
II. The School Segregation Cases
When Davis accepted the challenge of Governor Byrnes to represent
South Carolina in Bnggs v Elliott, the case filed against the Board of
Trustees of School District No. 22 of Clarendon County, South Carolina,
and against other school authorities there, he was confident that the numer-
ous precedents upholding the principle of "separate but equal" facilities in
both federal and state jurisdictions, including the Supreme Court's 1896
landmark decision in Plessy v Ferguson,' would ensure his success. He
viewed the subject as properly within the discretion of state legislatures. He
was particularly encouraged after reading what he considered to be an out-
standing opinion of Judge John J. Parker, Chief Judge of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, who had chaired the three-judge
panel that had decided the case in the defendants' favor at the trial level. 27
copy of the essay, which was privately printed. A highly edifying letter that the aged
Lamoignon de Malesherbes wrote to the Convention appears m Davis's account:
Citizen President, I am yet uninformed whether the Convention will allow the
defense of Louis XVI to be undertaken by counsel or not. If it be allowed, and
the choice of counsel is left to him, I request that Louis XVI may know, that if he
think proper to choose me for that office, I am ready to undertake it. I do not ask
you to make my offer known tothe Convention, for I am far from thinking myself
of sufficient importance to engage their attention: but I was twice appointed a
member of the Council of him who was my master, at a time when that office
excited a general ambition. I feel it my duty to offer myself as his counsel, now
that duty is thought dangerous by many.
John W Davis, The Lawyers of Louis XVI 5 (1941) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author). Malesherbes died on the guillotine for his loyalty to the king. It is not surprising
that he was one of Davis's heroes.
25. 343 U.S. 579 (1952)
26. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
27 Judge Parker lived m Charlotte, North Carolina, where I had worked m 1949 as a
summer clerk with his son Justice Francis I. Parker, who later became my partner and still
later a Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court. I had occasion to discuss the case with
the elder Judge Parker on several occasions during the pendency of the appeal. A brilliant
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In 'fact, Davis quoted liberally from that opinion in preparing the appellees'
initial brief for the United States Supreme Court. The Bnggs case was
eventually consolidated with four other cases in which the separate but equal
doctrine was being challenged as applied to public schools m Kansas,
Virginia, Delaware, and the District of Columbia.
William R. Meagher, a senior associate at Davis Polk at that time,"
assisted Davis m the preparation of the first Bnggs brief, to which Davis
gave more personal attention than was his custom. It was a task for which
his southern upbringing and conservative states' rights orientation had pre-
pared him both philosophically and jurisprudentially His friendship with
Governor Byrnes, with whom he had served in Congress forty years earlier,
and his custom of vacationing annually at Yeaman's Hall near Charleston,
provided added incentives. The fact that the substantial forces of the
NAACP were arrayed against him gave him little pause, despite that orgam-
zation's record of successes m the United States Supreme Court since World
War 11.9
The appeal was first argued before the United States Supreme Court on
December 9, 1952. Unknown to Davis, Justice Felix Frankfurter was m
frequent contact during this period with Philip Elman, then Special Assistant
to the United States Attorney General, who was writing an anicus curiae
brief on behalf of the United States government, flatly supporting the posi-
tion of the plaintiffs.' ° Elman was Frankfurter's former law clerk and life-
long confidante. His brief urged the Court to overrule Plessy v Ferguson,
but to allow desegregation to proceed gradually so that the country might
have time to become accustomed to the decision.
In an interview conducted by Norman Silber in 1987, Elman reported
at length on his continuing dialogue with Frankfurter during the time that the
School Segregation Cases were pending in the Court and during the time that
he was preparing the Department of Justice's briefs."i In a 1987 editorial
jurist, he believed that his decision had been pre-empted. "[When seventeen states and the
Congress of the United States have for more than three-quarters of a century required segre-
gation of the races m the public schools, and when this has received the approval of the
leading appellate courts m this country including the Supreme Court of the United States at
a time when that court included Chief Justice Taft and Justices Stone, Holmes, and Brandeis,
it is a late day to say that such segregation is violative of fundamental constitutional rights."
Briggs v Elliot, 98 F Supp. 529, 537 (E.D.S.C. 1951), vacated, 342 U.S. 350 (1952).
28. Meagher later became a named partner in the law firm of Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom in New York City
29 See KLUGER, supra note 5, at 543-44.
30. See id. at 560, 593, 600, 613; Elman, supra note 2, at 828-29, 843-44.
31. See Elman, supra note 2, at 832; see also KLUGER, supra note 5, at 600. Although
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entitled With All Deliberate Impropnety, the New York Times was highly
critical of that series of extra-judicial communications between Frankfurter
and Elman. 2
Because Frankfurter was concerned that the Court as it was then con-
stituted was unlikely to reach a unanmnous decision m favor of abolishing
public school segregation, a margin which he considered necessary in order
to defuse the expected hue and cry that such a result was likely to provoke
in the southern states, he persuaded his fellow justices that the cases should
be set for reargument on certain specific legal questions. With the help of
his then-clerk, Alexander Bickel, he prepared questions to be put to the
litigants. By that means, Frankfurter also hoped to allow sufficient time to
persuade certain of hIs reluctant brethren to overrule Plessy v Ferguson.33
The questions put to the litigants were as follows:
1. What evidence is there that the Congress which submitted and the
state legislatures and conventions which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment
contemplated or did not contemplate, understood or did not understand, that
it would abolish segregation in public schools?
2. If neither the Congress in submitting nor the States in ratifying the
Fourteenth Amendment understood that compliance with it would require the
inmediate abolition of segregation in public schools, was it nevertheless the
understanding of the framers of the Amendment
Elman told Silber that he had not coordinated the government's briefs with the plaintiffs'
briefs, he had earlier told Richard Kluger, who interviewed him for the book Simple Justice,
that he had participated in a number of strategy sessions with the NAACP lawyers at Howard
University Id. at 562.
32. "[N]ew revelations about the 1954 collaboration between Justice Felix Frankfurter
and Philip Elman, then a Justice Department lawyer, are deeply disturbing. They
concern the most important constitutional decision of modern times, Brown v. Board of
Education, the great school desegregation decision. The collaboration, long hinted at and
now spelled out in great detail, needs to be judged unethical, both by the standards of that
time and of this. It's not the first time m history that bright, high-minded officials became
so sure of their causes that they thought they were above the rules. As recounted m the
Harvard Law Review, Justice Frankfurter discussed the Court's most intimate secrets,
including the leanings and prejudices of its members, before and after Mr. Elman filed briefs
on the side of the black plaintiffs m the school desegregation case. [D]istinguished
service and former connection notwithstanding, Mr. Elman and Justice Frankfurter both
crossed a clear ethical line." With All Deliberate Impropriety, N.Y TiMES, Mar. 24, 1987,
at A30.
'33. See KLUGER, supra note 5, at 614; Elman, supra note 2, at 822-23. William H.
Rehnquist, now Chief Justice, was acting as Justice Jackson's clerk during the same 1952
term. A memorandum that he prepared for Justice Jackson on the subject of the school
segregation cases became an issue in his confirmation hearings for the Chief Justiceship.
KLUGER, supra, at 605-08.
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(a) that future Congresses might, m the exercise of their power
under Sec. 5 of the Amendment, abolish such segregation, or
(b) that it would be within the judicial power, in light of future
conditions, to construe the Amendment as abolishing such seg-
regation of its own force?
3. On the assumption that the answers to questions 2(a) and (b) do not
dispose of the issue, is it within the judicial power, in construing the Amend-
ment, to abolish segregation in public schools?
4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools violates the
Fourteenth Amendment,
(a) would a decree necessarily follow providing that, within the
limits set by normal geographic school districting, Negro chil-
dren should forthwith be admitted to schools of their choice, or
(b) may this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, permit an
effective gradual adjustment to be brought about from existing
segregated systems to a system not based on color distinctions?
5. On the assumption on which questions 4(a) and (b) are based, and
assuming further that this Court will exercise its equity powers to the end
described in question 4(b),
(a) should this Court formulate detailed decrees in these cases;
(b) if so what specific issues should the decrees reach;
(c) should this Court appoint a special master to hear evidence with
a view to recommending specific terms for such decrees;
(d) should this Court remand to the courts of first instance with
directions to frame decrees in these cases, and if so, what
general directions should the decrees of this Court include and,
what procedures should the courts of first instance follow in
arriving at the specific terms of more detailed decrees?
A fresh reading of those questions with the advantage of hindsight
suggests that they constituted a blueprint for the decision that the majority
of the Court had already reached and would provide an outline for the
Court's opinions as eventually rendered.' 4
In retrospect, it is clear that the direct consequence of the Frankfurter-
Elman discourse and the Frankfurter-Bickel strategy of delay was to require
the parties to prepare elaborate briefs and oral arguments on the questions
34. See Brown v Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1), 349 U.S. 294
(1955) (Brown 1). During the 1952 Court Term, Frankfurter had assigned Bickel the project
of reviewing the congressional debates on the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, those who
drafted the questions for reargument were already aware of the answer to their first question.
KLUGER, -supra note 5, at 598-99, 653; Elman, supra note 2, at 833.
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specified at a time when the outcome of the cases had already been decided.
After the first argument, Frankfurter saw the Court as favoring the plaintiffs
by a five to four margin. 5 Burton read the vote as six to three for the same
result. Jackson counted from five to seven votes in favor of overruling
Plessy v Ferguson.' Public school segregation in the United States was to
be abolished. It was just a question of when and how the Court would
announce its ruling.
It was at that point that I was by some good fortune called upon to assist
Davis in the preparation of the Bnggs brief for reargument. My first assign-
ment was that of reviewing the 1866 Congressional Globe reports of the 39th
Congress at the New York Public Library in order to respond to the Court's
first question - "What evidence is there that the Congress which submitted
and the state legislatures and conventions which ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment contemplated or did not contemplate, understood or did not
understand, that it would abolish segregation in public schools?"
The attorneys representing the defendants in the Virgina case - Justin
Moore, Archibald Robertson, John W Riely, and Justin Moore, Jr. of the
Hunton & Williams firm in Richmond together with Lindsey Almond and
Henry Wickham of the office of Attorney General of Virginia - conferred
with Davis, Meagher, and me in New York that summer. The Virginia
lawyers agreed to pull the laboring oar in researching the understanding of
the state legislatures which ratified the Amendment, while we agreed to
study the reports of the 39th Congress, which had submitted the Amendment
to the states.
The South Carolina brief was prepared by our team of three, with
Davis's contribution being primarily that of adding colorful phrases here and
there to cause an otherwise pedestrian prose to leap from the page. Taggart
Whipple, a Davis Polk partner, eventually became involved at Davis's
request to assist in coordinating the project. His contribution was principally
supervisory, including some editing of the final product.
While the dog days of the New York City summer came and went, it
became increasingly clear from a study of the Congressional Globe reports
that most of the members of the 39th Congress had not understood that the
Fourteenth Amendment that it submitted would abolish segregation in the
public schools, at least certainly not posthaste or per se. Without undertak-
ing to catalogue the myriad reasons that caused the Davis Polk team to reach
that conclusion, it is enough to say here that (1) those who managed the bill
35. KLUGER, supra note 5, at 614; Elman, supra note 2, at 829.
36. KLUGER, supra note 5, at 614.
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that was eventually enacted as the Civil Rights Act of 1866 during the term
in which the Fourteenth Amendment was submitted disclaimed any intention
that the Act should prohibit public school segregation; (2) the same 39th
Congress that enacted the Fourteenth Amendment during the spring of 1866
also enacted at least two measures dealing with the administration of segre-
gated schools in the District of Columbia; (3) hardly anything was said on
the subject of school segregation during the debate on the Fourteenth
Amendment itself; and (4) a number of legislators suggested that the Four-
teenth Amendment was being adopted in order to resolve any doubts about
the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
Most of the state legislatures that ratified the Amendment during the
two years following Congress's submission of it also enacted statutes allow-
ing or requiring public school segregation in their particular states without
any reference being made to the Fourteenth Amendment. The coincidence
of all of these circumstances virtually established beyond doubt that the
Amendment was not originally expected to abolish public school segre-
gation. 7 Accordingly, the Bnggs brief described our findings at great
length.3"
The more significant question, as it developed, was the second question,
which, in view of their earlier research, Frankfurter and Bickel had already
concluded was likely to constitute the basis for the Court's decision to
abolish public school segregation: "If neither the Congress in submitting nor
the states in ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment understood that compliance
with it would require the immediate abolition of segregation in public
schools, was it nevertheless the understanding of the framers that it
would be within the judicial power, in light of future conditions, to construe
the Amendment as abolishing such segregation of its own force?" Not
37 Tis conclusion is supported by Richard Kluger in his definitive study of the School
Segregation Cases. KLUGER, supra note 5, at 578, 634-35. The conclusion is also supported
by Alexander Bickel m The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV
L. REV 1, 58-65 (1995).
38. Richard Kluger suggests that the Davis brief exaggerated the case by claiming that
it was "the expressed intent of the framers" not to abolish segregated schools. KLUGER,
supra note 5, at 649. The Bnggs brief contained no such clan that the framers of the
amendment had expressly disavowed any such intention. South Carolina's position was that
"the overwhelming preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that Congress, which
submitted and the state legislature which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, did not
contemplate and did not understand that it would abolish segregation in public schools." Brief
for Appellees on Reargument at 8, Briggs (Oct. Term, 1953, No. 2). The draftsmen of the
South Carolina brief were at pains not to exaggerate the evidence favoring their clients'
position. Fortunately, they were not presented with the temptation.
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surprisingly, our Bnggs brief reflected Davis's sincere conviction that the
Supreme Court had no power to extend or enlarge the scope of the
prohibitions of the Amendment beyond those originally contemplated by its
framers. Of course, this question presented an issue that constitutional
scholars have debated for years. It invokes the ghosts of the "strict con-
structiomsts" and the "liberal constructiomsts" - of the "judicial activists"
and the "judicial conservatives." In other words, it poses m a constitutional
context the age-old question of the degree of judicial restraint that the Court
should exercise in rendering its decisions.39 May the Court treat the "equal
protection" language of the Fourteenth Amendment as sufficiently latitudi-
narian to allow it to find actions unconstitutional that were clearly not con-
sidered as prohibited by the Amendment at the time it was adopted or at the
time it was adopted by previous courts? May the meaning of constitutional
language change with the times, depending upon the development of the
social scene, particularly in the field of race relations? In an article written
several years after the Court rendered is decision, Alexander Bickel sug-
gested that the Court's ultimate decision was based upon the view that the
meaning of the Amendment may actually evolve through the years to meet
society's evolving concerns and that the framers may have contemplated
such an evolution.40
Despite Frankfurter's reputation for judicial restraint in the face of
legislative edict,41 he appears to have abandoned any such reservations in the
School Segregation Cases. When Chief Justice Vinson died, the newly
elected President Eisenhower appointed Earl Warren to the Chief Justice-
ship.42 Thereafter, Frankfurter's efforts to forge a unanimous position in
39. During the first argument m December 1952, Justice Burton asked Davis, "What
is your answer to the suggestion that at that time the conditions and relations between the
two races were such that what might have been unconstitutional then would not be
unconstitutional now." KLUGER, supra note 5, at 572. Davis responded that changed
conditions could not broaden the meaning of the terms of the Amendment.
40. Bickel, supra note 37, at 64. Chief Justice Warren's statement at the outset of his
first opinion supports Bickel's view. "In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock
back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson
was written. We must consider public education m the light of its full development and its
present place in American life throughout the Nation." Brown v Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483, 492 (1954). And presumably the Court was also prepared to consider race
relations m the light of current developments. Judge Learned Hand was critical of the Brown
decision on just that account. Brown, he said, constituted an impermissible second-guessing
of legislative choices. GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 656-57
41. KLUGER, supra note 5, at 596.
42. Eisenhower actually considered appointing Davis to that vacancy despite his
advanced age, but decided in favor of Warren. He had made a commitment to appoint
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favor of abolishing segregation began to bear fruit. He now had the
strongest possible ally There was never any doubt in Chief Justice War-
ren's mind as to his view of the cases from the day he assumed Ins duties.43
He was strongly in favor of using the School Segregation Cases as the
vehicle by which to abolish the "separate but equal" doctrine, which he
considered to have rested from the beginning upon the fallacious idea that
blacks are inferior.'
On December 17, 1953, when Davis strode again into the Supreme
Court in his typical club coat and striped pants,45 he remained as confident
as ever that the Court would vindicate South Carolina's position. It was as
though the social and political winds that raged over his head did not exist
for him, since they were not a part of his, anma. Based upon a thorough
study of the history of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
legal precedents that since construed it, the Davis team confidently predicted
that the Court would rule for their clients by a vote of six to three, conceding
only Justices Black, Douglas, and perhaps Warren to the plaintiffs. We
could hardly have been more mistaken.
In addressing the Court, Davis reviewed South Carolina's answers to
the Court's question with his usual grace and style, pointing to evidence that
the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly did not intend to outlaw
the public school segregation that flourished contemporaneously and for
decades later and that had repeatedly received the Court's imprimatur.
"Somewhere, some time, to every principle there comes a moment of repose
when it has been so often pronounced, so confidently relied upon, so long
continued, that it passes the limits of judicial discretion and disturbance,"
said Davis. 6
Warren to the Court at the time of the Republican National Convention at which Eisenhower
was selected for the presidential nomination over Warren. STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, 2
EISENHOWER: THEPRESIDENT 128 (1984). Eisenhower would have preferred that the Court
uphold Plessy v. Ferguson and said as much on a number of occasions, though only m
private. Id. at 190. According to Warren, the decision ended cordial relations between the
two. Id.
43. KLUGER, supra note 5, at 679.
44. See id. at 679.
45. Davis always wore formal attire when apjearmg before the Supreme Court, a habit
which he developed from his time as Solicitor General. In fact, he was known for his
sartorial correctness. At a time when hats were the fashion for men, he purportedly proffered
a ten dollar bill to a young associate whom he encountered hatless on the elevator at 15 Broad
Street, with instructions that he remedy that condition during the lunch hour. The story may
be apocryphal, but it illustrates Davis's concern for proper dress.
46. See KLUGER, supra note 5, at 671. In response to a question from his interviewer
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The unanimous decision of the Court was announced on May 17, 1954;
it held segregation m the public schools unconstitutional per se. Warren had
convinced even the most reluctant member of the Court, Justice Stanley
Reed, not to dissent. The Court then set the cases for further reargument on
the question of the relief to be granted. There is no question that the
purpose of this delay was to give the southern states another year m which
to become accustomed to such a radical cultural change before implementing
the new policy of desegregation. Davis himself was no longer interested.
He made it clear that he did not care to participate in dismantling the
institution that he had undertaken to defend.47
Symbolically, just two weeks before the second reargument was sched-
uled to occur, Davis died on March 24, 1955 at the age of eighty-one m
Charleston, South Carolina, where he was hospitalized while on vacation at
Yeaman's Hall. The entire profession mourned the passing of the man
whose career had defined the term professionalism.
III. An Assessment
How should one characterize Davis the lawyer and Davis the man?
There can be no doubt that he was one of the outstanding American lawyers
of all time. His record of appearances before the United States Supreme
Court is unequaled m this century As an appellate advocate, he had no
peers.' A paper he delivered to the Association of the Bar of New York,
The Argument of an Appeal, is considered the definitive statement on the
subject.49 When Davis appeared before the Supreme Court, he was shown
as to the value of oral argument m the Supreme Court, Philip Elman opined, "IThe more
important the case is, the more far-reaching its effects, and the more the Justices have studied
and thought about the issues beforehand, the less likely it is that the quality of the oral
arguments will affect the decision. Brown was quintessentially that kind of case. In
Brown, nothing the lawyers said made a difference. Thurgood Marshall could have stood up
there and recited 'Mary had a little lamb,' and the result would have been exactly the same."
Elman, supra note 2, at 851-52. No doubt this hyperbole does much less than justice to
Marshall's contribution. Still, Elman succeeded m making his point.
47 Davis declined to submit a statement to the State of South Carolina for the firm's
services. Nevertheless, Governor Byrnes made him a gift of a beautiful silver tea service
from "The People of South Carolina."
48. See GREENBERG, supra note 4, at 166; GuNTHER, supra note 3, at 461, HARBAUGH,
supra note 6, at 399; KLUGER, supra note 5, at 543; Elman, supra note 2, at 838.
49. Davis's ten points succinctly stated are as follows:
(1) Change places with the judge.
(2) Make yourself heard.
(3) State the history of the case.
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a unique degree of deference. He invariably received the rapt attention of
the Justices - even in his last appearance in the Bnggs case, in which all the
cards were stacked against him. Fortune magazine aptly said of him that
he was noted for a "calm, gracious and modest elucidation of complex
matters. ,'
Even Davis's opponents acknowledged Ins excellence. Thurgood
Marshall accepted the view that Davis was motivated by Ins reverence for
states' rights in his enthusiasm for the South Carolina cause. "He was a
great advocate, the greatest," said Marshall." l
From time to time, other lawyers retained Davis to render legal
opinions on matters with which their clients were concerned but as to which
they wished to avoid litigation.' They readily agreed to accept his opimon
as final.
In my own experience as Davis's "friend and helpmate, 3 1 knew him
as a warm and kindly mentor who, despite his unchallenged stature as the
dean of the American bar, was always quick to put me at ease. Others also
found him extraordinarily gracious. Judge Learned Hand once remarked
that he had to steel himself against Davis's special charm for fear of deciding
in his favor without regard to the merits of the case.'
If in retrospect Davis may have appeared insensitive to the emotional
and psychological needs of African-Americans, it was a trait common to
(4) State the facts with candor.
(5) Go for the jugular.
(6) Rejoice when the Court asks questions.
(7) Read sparingly and only from necessity
(8) Avoid personalities.
(9) Know your record from cover to cover.
(10) Sit down.
HARBAUGH, supra note 6, at 401-02.
50. The U.S. Bar, FORTUNE, May 1949, at 90, 91.
51. HARBAUGH, supra note 6, at 50.
52. Nelson Adams, a Davis Polk partner who assisted Davis m preparing such opinions,
notes that "by a few deft touches such as the insertion of a word or phrase at a critical point
he would add the sparks that were needed to bring the opinion to life." Letter from Nelson
Adams, Senior Counsel, Davis Polk and Wardwell (successor firm to Davis Polk Wardwell
Sunderland & Kiendl), to the author (Apr. 24, 1995) (on file with author).
53. When I left Davis Polk to return to Charlotte to practice law in 1954, that is how
he signed the photograph he gave me.
54. "He was delightful and engaging," said Hand. "He had a way of stating differences
that left no record of ill feeling." HARBAUGH, supra note 6, at 405. Davis generally made
a point of shaking hands with his lawyer adversary when he entered the courtroom before
argument.
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many of us who shared his Southern upbringing. Fortunately, time has
provided our generation an opportunity to do penance for its once myopic
views. And, with whatever justification, the Warren Court fiat has led the
way to a higher justice.
Perhaps the most vivid and lasting impression I have of the man whom
most of his partners addressed as "Mr. Davis" is that which King George V
reportedly said of him: "He was the most perfect gentleman I ever met. "'
No doubt that quality served him well m achieving near perfection as a
lawyer. Surely m John W Davis the consummate gentleman met the
consummate professional, in defeat as well-as m victory Perhaps that is a
prescription for curing many of the ills that beset our contemporary Bar.
55. Id. at 146. As a graduate of Washington and Lee, Davis no doubt was familiar with
Robert E. Lee's definition of a "gentleman"-
The forbearing use of power does not only form a touchstone, but the o
manner in which an individual enjoys certain advantages over others is a test of
a true gentleman.
The power which the strong have over the weak, the magistrate over the
citizen, the employer over the employed, the educated over the unlettered, the
experienced over the confiding, even the clever over the silly - the forbeanng
and inoffensive use of all this power or authority, or a total abstinence from it
when the case admits it, will show the gentleman m a plain light. The gentleman
does not needlessly and unnecessarily remind an offender of a wrong he may have
committed against him. He cannot only forgive, he can forget; and he strives for
that nobleness of self and mildness of character which imparts sufficient strength
to let the past be but the past. A true man of honor feels humbled hnself when he
cannot help humbling others.
J. WILLIAM JONES, PERSONAL REMINISCENCES, ANECDOTES, & LETTERS OF GEN. ROBERT
E. LEE 163 (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1874) (quoting from loose sheet in Lee's
handwriting found among his papers at death). Davis's relationship with his valet Charles
Hanson was extremely close; Hanson was one of his greatest admirers. HARBAUGH, supra
note 6, at 526.
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